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Faith in the Future: Sexuality, Religion
and the Public Sphere
CARL F. STYCHIN*
Abstract—The clash between religious freedom and equality for lesbians and gay
men has become a controversial legal issue in the United Kingdom. Increasingly,
claims are made that compliance with anti-discrimination norms impacts upon
conscientious, faith-based objectors to same-sex sexual acts. This article explores
this issue and draws insights from North American case law, where this question
has been considered in the context of competing constitutional rights. It raises far-
reaching issues concerning the distinction between belief and practice, as well as
the role of identity in the public sphere. The author advocates that courts and
tribunals should adopt a fact-specific approach which is sensitive to the rights in
a particular context, and which focuses upon the values of accommodation,
tolerance and mutual respect.
1. Introduction
Liberal democracies are faced with what appears to be an irreconcilable clash of
two conflicting rights. First, recent years have witnessed the rapid development
of law reform on the basis of ‘sexual orientation’. Rights have been primarily
targeted at employment, the provision of goods and services and the legal
recognition of relationships. They are justified on the basis of equality, human
rights and anti-discrimination. Increasingly, however, equality rights are seen to
conflict directly with religious and conscientious freedom, by those who claim
that anti-discrimination law in practice undermines a right to act according
to their beliefs. For example, interpretation of religious doctrine leads some
conservative Christians to the conclusion that same-sex sexual acts are immoral
and that they must not promote them in any way. In this article, I explore how
this issue is unfolding in the United Kingdom, and I provide comparative
analysis with North America, where the question has generated much attention
for some time. The examples I have chosen are not limited to direct clashes
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between religion and sexuality, but they all do shed light on it. I then propose
a way in which this apparently intractable conflict might be managed.
2. Competing Narratives of Exclusion
Within the United Kingdom, progress towards equality for lesbians and gay
men has proceeded at a remarkable pace over the past decade, and this has
occurred with less dissent and controversy than has been witnessed elsewhere.1
Of particular relevance is anti-discrimination in employment and the provision
of goods and services, as well as the creation of the new legal status of civil
partnership.2 These fields provide the foci for a clash with religious and
conscientious objectors. It is apparent from the structure of these ‘progressive’
interventions that legislators themselves recognize the existence of potential
conflict. For example, limited exemptions are included in anti-discrimination
law.3 The preparedness of government to attempt a reconciliation of conflicting
rights ab initio might also speak to the way in which rights discourse in the
United Kingdom is understood as inevitably a product of accommodation.4
However, despite attempts by the legislature to mediate divergent claims
through the delineation of rights, clashes are entering tribunals and courts with
some regularity. Rights discourse lends itself to these conflicts. Freedom of
religion and conscience remain central to liberal democracies, and the increas-
ing role of human rights discourse provides the means through which the
freedom can be ‘framed’ through the juridification of politics.5 But the protec-
tion of religion within liberalism is paradoxical. While it may occupy a
prominent place within liberal rights rhetoric, ‘the terms of the debate about
the place of religion within society are set by a secular liberalism that does not
and cannot view religion through religion’s own eyes’.6 The freedom to hold
a particular belief may be absolute—the bedrock of the right—but the
manifestation of the belief is constrained from the outset. Once religion enters
the public, it is a qualified right which is limited by liberalism’s other tenets,
such as potential harm to non-believers.7 As Benjamin Berger argues,
1 See K Nash, ‘Human Rights Culture: Solidarity, Diversity and the Right to be Different’ (2005) 9
Citizenship Studies 335–48.
2 Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations SI 2003/1661; Equality Act (Sexual Orientation)
Regulations SI 2007/1263; Civil Partnership Act 2004. The issue of religious speech and incitement to
homophobic hatred is another important issue, but beyond the scope of this article. See I Leigh, ‘Homophobic
Speech, Equality Denial and Religious Expression’ in I Hare and J Weinstein (eds), Extreme Speech and Democracy
(OUP, Oxford 2009) 373.
3 See generally, R Sandberg and N Doe, ‘Religious Exemptions in Discrimination Law’ (2007) 66 CLJ
302–12.
4 See KD Ewing, ‘The Human Rights Act and Parliamentary Democracy’ (1999) 62 MLR 79–99.
5 M Smith, ‘Framing Same-sex Marriage in Canada and the United States: Goodridge, Halpern and the
National Boundaries of Political Discourse’ (2007) 16 Social and Legal Studies 5–26.
6 A Bradney, Law and Faith in a Sceptical Age (Routledge-Cavendish, Abingdon 2009) 33.
7 R Ahdar and I Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (OUP, Oxford 2005) 163.
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‘law manifests a degree of comfort with religion as belief and displays a kind of
anxiety and awkwardness with religion as practice’.8
This raises the more fundamental paradox of liberalism—that it can be both
liberal in its claimed neutrality regarding visions of the good life (however
illiberal they might be), but only to the extent that those visions remain
personal and private, closeted from public display. Religion is also constructed
through liberalism as individual and ‘one of many rational choices’,9 ‘connected
to the liberty and autonomy of the subject’.10 In this way, freedom of religion
is processed through liberalism such that its protection as a public right is
contingent on its compatibility with liberalism’s constitutive terms. The lan-
guage of objective ‘balancing’ and ‘harm’ provides the means by which liberal-
ism can then evade the charge that it is imposing itself illiberally on those
who do not share its liberal values; for the law must balance the rights of all
as to how they live.11 This underscores that liberalism and pluralism are not
necessarily synonymous.12 For example, anti-discrimination laws, as pointed
out by religious rights advocates, are not ‘morally neutral; they evince a
judgment that certain conditions or behaviour warrant protection’,13 which can
lead to ‘the imposition of a societal consensus of the ‘‘common good’’ ’,14 which
presumes the ‘moral neutrality of homosexuality and bisexuality’.15
In sum, freedom of religion—and of conscience more broadly—is constituted
through the distinction between belief and manifestation. In legal terms, this
delineation is well established. In R v Secretary of State for Education and
Employment; ex parte Williamson,16 the House of Lords considered the com-
patibility of the extended statutory ban on corporal punishment in schools with
parents’ freedom of religion under art 9(1) of the European Convention
on Human Rights. Lord Bingham of Cornhill described the right in robust
terms as including ‘the right to express and practice one’s belief ’ for ‘with-
out this, freedom of religion would be emasculated’.17 But when it comes to
manifestation, the right is ‘qualified’ by a ‘balance’ to be struck ‘between
freedom to practise one’s own beliefs and the interests of others affected by
8 BL Berger, ‘Law’s Religion: Rendering Culture’ (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall LJ 277–314, 303. While some
would argue that religious accommodation can fit comfortably into standard liberal discourse, my argument is
that, in this field, it is an increasingly difficult relationship which presents a challenge for liberalism.
9 A Fielding, ‘When Rights Collide: Liberalism, Pluralism and Freedom of Religion in Canada’ (2008) 13
Appeal 28–50, 33. I am not claiming here that the liberal system has never accommodated the public
manifestation of religious belief; only that to do so, when that manifestation is perceived as itself illiberal, leaves
liberalism in a dilemma.
10 Berger (n 8) 294.
11 J Rivers, ‘Law, Religion and Gender Equality’ (2007) 9 Ecclesiastical LJ 24–52, 47.
12 Fielding (n 9) 31.
13 GW Dent Jr, ‘Civil Rights for Whom?: Gay Rights Versus Religious Freedom’ (2006–2007) 95 Kentucky
LJ 553–647, 637–8.
14 Fielding (n 9) 31.
15 C Feldblum, ‘Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion’ (2006) 72 Brooklyn LJ 61–123, 87.
16 [2005] UKHL 15.
17 Ibid [16].
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those practices’.18 The right is further limited when it concerns the rights of
employees to manifest religious beliefs in the workplace and the extent
of reasonable accommodation demanded of the employer. In this context,
infringement is difficult to establish, with an ‘expectation of accommodation,
compromise and, if necessary, sacrifice in the manifestation of religious
beliefs’.19 Thus, while the freedom to believe may be entirely subjective,
once faith is manifested, it ‘must satisfy some modest, objective minimum
requirements’20 and, if non-religious, be ‘related to an aspect of human life or
behaviour of comparable importance to that normally found with religious
belief’.21
For defenders of religious freedoms, the liberal rights paradigm can be
limiting and problematic. The understanding of religion which underpins it
may not reflect how faith is actually experienced as a comprehensive world
view.22 Conscience is not an individual choice, nor may it be capable of
privatization.23 Indeed, according to the model of rationality that underpins
liberalism, the faith experience may be incomprehensible.24 The test of whether
the manifestation of belief impacts upon the rights of others also may not be
relevant when one is faced with the compulsion to act.25 To the extent that
religion presents a world view, the division between public and private, and
manifestation and belief, is a meaningless and, arguably, hypocritical distinc-
tion.26 As a consequence, the contours of the right—as it has been defined, for
example, within European human rights jurisprudence—illegitimately con-
strains it. While proponents of freedom of religion may accept the need for
balancing, they are more likely to advocate that it should be done openly as a
majoritarian limitation on the exercise of the right, rather than constitutively in
the definition of its scope.27
In the face of the increasing acceptance of sexuality equality, a counter-
discourse on freedom of religion, belief and conscience has gained prominence
in the UK, with an important role particularly for conservative Christian
advocates.28 Although it might be argued that, in contemporary Britain,
Christian faith has become largely a private matter (during the same period in
which sexual identity has saturated the public sphere), these moves are resisted
18 Ibid [17].
19 R v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15, [54] [emphasis added].
20
Williamson (n 16) [23].
21 Ibid [24].
22 Berger (n 8) 291.
23 Ahdar and Leigh (n 7) 165.
24 Bradney (n 6) 30.
25 Ahdar and Leigh (n 7) 165.
26 Ibid 161.
27 Ibid 184.
28 This is also the case in the USA, where ‘the burden of complying with antidiscrimination rules has become
one of the premier concerns of conservative Christians’: A Koppelman, ‘You Can’t Hurry Love: Why
Antidiscrimination Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions’ (2006) 72 Brooklyn LJ
125–46, 135.
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by some Christians, who reject privatization, which they attribute to the
unsustainable separation of belief and practice.29 In fact, the dichotomy has
been compared to the well known distinction between sexual identities and acts
(ie the ‘being’ and ‘doing’ of homosexuality).30 Thus, the regulation of both
religion and sexuality, it is argued, has been facilitated by dichotomous
constructions in law. There is also a similarity as between religion and sexuality
in the way in which the discourse of harm has been deployed by law as a
means of limiting rights claims. Historically, the harm discourse was central to
resisting claims for sexuality equality and, in rights claims regarding the
manifestation of religion, harm again provides a frequently deployed rhetorical
device. The harm now is found in the denial of the equality rights of others,
such as sexual minorities. Courts thus increasingly struggle with precisely the
extent to which society should accommodate the manifestation of religion,
especially when opponents can point to competing values.31 Conversely, those
who support freedom of religion claim that the manifestation of others’ rights
clash with their religious faith, and they (sometimes) argue that practices of
identity in the public sphere should be open to all.32 Religion, like sexuality,
thus is characterized as a collective identity rather than an individual choice.33
Ironically, supporters of sexuality equality at times fall back on the public–
private, belief–conduct distinctions as the justification for curtailing religious
freedom—relegating those of faith to the closet from which they themselves
have emerged.34 In so doing, equality itself becomes a world view which
monopolizes the public sphere, as ‘a certain paradox ensues in which the
coerced adoption of certain cultural norms becomes a requisite for entry into
a polity that defines itself as the avatar of freedom’.35
The construction of rights in conflict and in need of balancing pervades
the relationship of sexuality and religion. For example, with respect to the
exceptions in UK employment law (which are themselves derived from
European employment law), the High Court has upheld their legality.36 At
the same time, Richards J emphasized their narrowness. Reg 7(3) for example:
has to be construed strictly since it is a derogation from the principle of equal
treatment; and it has to be construed purposively so as to ensure, so far as possible,
compatibility with the Directive. When its terms are considered in light of those
29 See eg A Opromolla, ‘Law, Gender and Religious Belief in Europe: Considerations from a Catholic
Perspective’ (2007) 9 Ecclesiastical LJ 161–74, 164.
30 Rivers (n 11) 36.
31 See eg the decision of the South African Constitutional Court in Christian Education South Africa v Minister
of Education 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC).
32 See eg G Trotter, ‘The Right to Decline Performance of Same-Sex Civil Marriages: The Duty to
Accommodate Public Servants – A Response to Professor MacDougall’ (2007) 70 Saskatchewan L Rev 365–92.
33 Berger (n 8) 283–91.
34 See B MacDougall, ‘Refusing to Officiate at Same-Sex Civil Marriages’ (2006) 69 Saskatchewan L Rev
351–73; R Wintemute, ‘Religion vs Sexual Orientation: A Clash of Human Rights?’ (2002) 1 J L Equality
125–54.
35 J Butler, ‘Sexual Politics, Torture, and Secular Time’ (2008) 59 BJS 1–23, 4.
36 R (Amicus – MSF section and others) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2004] IRLR 430 (Admin).
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interpretative principles, they can be seen to afford an exception only in very limited
circumstances.37
The Court held that the exception ‘is very narrow in scope’38 and that Reg
7(3)(b)(ii) ‘is also going to be a very far from easy test to satisfy in practice’.39
Thus, the law seeks to ensure that this exceptional space40 is clearly
delineated with firm borders, so that acts of religion which undermine the
principle of anti-discrimination (and thereby lead to harm) are allowed to enter
the public only in the narrowest of circumstances. At the same time, Richards J
accepted the impossibility of bracketing sexual acts from identity: ‘the protec-
tion against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation relates as much to
the manifestation of that orientation in the form of sexual behaviour as it does
to sexuality as such’.41
The ways in which the construction of sexuality and religion mirror each
other through the public–private distinction has not been lost on those com-
mentators who argue that faith as a world view cannot reasonably be closeted.42
Rather, in its essence, religion demands manifestation in the public sphere and
to require otherwise is to undermine its core. For those of faith, to demand
privatization is in practice to require exit from the public sphere.43 This
exclusion would strike at the heart of democratic citizenship. The law thereby
would repeat the historical exclusion of lesbians and gay men from those same
public spaces, reproducing the metaphor of the closet.
This has become a live issue, as claims are increasingly made which
appropriate the language of discrimination and oppression in support of con-
scientious objectors.44 The judiciary has begun to grapple with this in a series
of high profile cases, which have exposed liberalism’s difficulties in reconciling
competing world views in their manifestation in the public sphere. In Re The
Christian Institute’s and others’ Application for Judicial Review, the Equality Act
(Sexual Orientation) Regulation (Northern Ireland) 2006, which prohibited
direct and indirect discrimination and harassment on the grounds of sexual
orientation in the field of goods and services, premises management, education
and public functions, was subjected to a judicial review action.45 Weatherup J
quashed the harassment provision based on a lack of proper consultation.46
37 Ibid [115].
38 Ibid [117].
39 Ibid.
40 The use of the idea of exceptionality is indebted to K Attell (tr), G Agamben, State of Exception (University
of Chicago Press, Chicago 2005).
41
Amicus (n 36) [119].
42 Rivers (n 11) 36.
43 Trotter (n 32) 367.
44 I develop this point in C F Stychin, ‘Closet Cases: ‘‘Conscientious Objection’’ to Lesbian and Gay Legal
Equality’ (2009) 18 Griffith L Rev 17–40.
45 [2008] NI 86 (QB).
46 Ibid [34].
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With respect to the claimed art 9(1) right, he adopted the distinction between
belief and manifestation, and he recognized the worth of the belief claim:
The belief in question is the orthodox Christian belief that the practice of homo-
sexuality is sinful. . . .The belief is a long established part of the belief system of the
world’s major religions. This is not a belief that is unworthy of recognition. I am
satisfied that art 9 is engaged in the present case. The extent to which the mani-
festation of the belief may be limited is a different issue.47
While refusing to make any abstract determination on the appropriate balance
of rights—finding instead that this would ‘depend on the particular circum-
stances’48—Weatherup J did determine that the regulations would cause
‘material interference . . . to an extent which is significant in practice’ which
would require a ‘balance of rights’.49 In other words, he acknowledged that the
exemptions carved out within the regulations did not necessarily amount to the
final word on balancing. There is an acceptance that reasonable accommoda-
tion will be necessary in order to protect the manifestation of religion and
conscience.
But in actual factual contexts that have come before decision makers, there
has been little willingness to carve out space for conscientious objectors to
manifest their beliefs. A magistrate who objected to placing children with same-
sex couples pursuant to the Children and Adoption Act 2002 was found not to
have triggered the Religion and Belief Regulations on the facts.50 The Appeal
Tribunal commented in obiter dictum, moreover, that the Tribunal at first
instance was ‘manifestly entitled’ to conclude that even had they been relevant,
‘the Department was fully justified in insisting that magistrates must apply
the law of the land as their oath requires, and cannot opt out of cases on the
grounds that they may have to apply or give effect to laws to which they have
a moral or other principled objection’.51
A Christian Registrar, Ms Ladele, who objected to participating in civil
partnership registrations was successful in her claim of discrimination at first
instance, only to be denied relief by the Employment Appeal Tribunal.52 She
characterized her position within the discourse of minority rights:
She emphasised that she was placed in a dilemma and had either to honour her faith
or the demands of the council. She asked for the council to consider the difficulty she
faced and try to accommodate her concerns so that she could combine her work with
her Christian commitments. She asked for sympathetic treatment as a member of
a minority.53
47 Ibid [50].
48 Ibid [65].
49 Ibid [89].
50
McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs [2008] IRLR 29 (EAT).
51 Ibid [62].
52
London Borough of Islington v Ladele and Liberty [2009] IRLR 154 (EAT).
53 Ibid [9].
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The Appeal Tribunal rejected the claim that she suffered either direct or
indirect discrimination or harassment. Ms Ladele was not entitled to ‘pick and
choose what duties she would perform depending upon whether they were in
accordance with her religious views, at least in circumstances where her
personal stance involved discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation’.54
The Tribunal relied on the distinction between belief and practice, and the
limit to the right was found in the rights of others: ‘it necessarily follows that
the manifestation of the belief must give way when it involves discriminating on
grounds which Parliament has provided to be unlawful’.55
Finally, in a case involving a Christian relationship counsellor, an Employ-
ment Tribunal upheld dismissal in the wake of a refusal to serve same-sex
couples, finding this to be a ‘proportionate means of achieving the legitim-
ate aim’ of providing non-discriminatory services.56 Accommodation of the
counsellor’s request could result in clients facing ‘potential rejection’ at the
claimant’s hands, which would undermine the aim of the service as a whole.57
For the Christian Institute, a non-denominational Christian charity which
has sponsored these actions, faith is being socially and legally marginalized;
banished from the public sphere. In a clash of rights, religion is the loser, and
this has a deleterious impact on citizenship participation. Responding to Ladele,
a spokesman for the Institute explained:
I think it will be a concern to all Christians, because it does fail to understand that
religious liberty is the liberty not just to believe certain things in your head but also to
act in accordance with those beliefs. If this ruling is allowed to stand, it will endanger
not just registrars but workers in other situations too. We are not saying that religious
belief should trump everything, but where there is a reasonable religious belief it
should be accommodated.58
The Institute’s Director, Colin Hart, was even more direct in his forecast,
warning that ‘[i]f this decision is allowed to stand it will help squeeze out
Christians from the public sphere because of their religious beliefs on ethical
issues’.59
Rights discourse, which has proven so receptive to claims to sexuality
equality in the UK, seems (to them at least) to offer little to those of faith,
despite the presence of s 13(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998. Developments
at the European Union level only fuel the fears of marginalization, exclusion
and criminalization. A draft EU Directive aims to implement the principle of
54 Ibid [111].
55 Ibid [127].
56
McFarlane v Relate Avon Ltd, Employment Tribunals, 17 December 2008.
57 Ibid [46].
58 M Beckford, ‘Religious workers fear they could be forced from jobs in wake of tribunal appeal’ Telegraph
(20 December 2008) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/newstopics/religion/3851503/Religious-workers-fear-they-could-
be-forced-from-jobs-in-wake-of-tribunal-appeal.htm accessed 24 March 2009.
59 M Beckford, ‘Christian registrar loses appeal with Islington council over civil partnerships’ (19 December
2008) http://www.christian.org.uk/pressreleases/2008/12december/19dec08.htm accessed 24 March 2009.
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equal treatment on the basis of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual
orientation, and is designed to cover access to goods and services.60 It also
includes a harassment provision, ‘defined as taking place when someone
violates another person’s dignity and creates an intimidating, hostile, degrading,
humiliating or offensive environment for them’.61 Although the proposal covers
a range of grounds including religion and belief, for the Christian Institute,
the overriding concern is that the inclusion of sexual orientation will impact
directly upon Christians across the European Union.62 In particular, the
harassment provision allegedly will render any speech critical of a homosexual
‘lifestyle’ subject to legal sanction.63
As lesbian and gay legal equality becomes increasingly mainstreamed,
competing claims grounded in freedom of religion will continue. In the next
two sections of this article, I explore how these claims are balanced in other
jurisdictions. In the next section, I turn to the United States, a jurisdiction with
a unique history of constitutional rights discourse, in which religion and
sexuality have proven to be a particularly combustible combination.
3. Free Exercise and Forced Messages
The struggle for lesbian and gay legal equality in the United States has been a
long and arduous journey, with varying degrees of success at federal, state and
local levels.64 Courts have rejected ‘heightened scrutiny’ of Equal Protection
claims by lesbians and gay men,65 although the Supreme Court has accepted
that ‘targeted stigmatizing exclusions’ of gays and lesbians are not constitu-
tionally permissible.66 No federal statute explicitly prohibits discrimination
against lesbians and gay men. Thus, ‘sexual orientation antidiscrimination
norms depend on cities and states for their source of law and can be trumped
by federal protection for religious freedom’.67 A variety of successes can be
found at state and local levels, as sexuality equality gradually has come to be
accepted in law and society. At the same time, ‘most of these laws have
exceptions for religious institutions and religious ‘‘practices’’ or ‘‘exercises’’,
60 Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment
between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’ COM (2008) 426, 2 July
2008. The European Parliament has passed a number of amendments ‘which strengthened the package of
proposals and stripped out the exemptions for ‘‘organisations based on religion and belief’’ ’ as well as qualifying
other religious exemptions: J Wynne-Jones, ‘EU law may force faith schools to take atheists’ Sunday Telegraph
(London 12 April 2009) News 8. The draft directive has yet to receive approval of the European Council.
61 Commission (EC), ‘EU Directive on goods and services’ (winter 2008/09) http://www.christian.org.uk/
issues/2008/eudirective/briefwinter08.pdf accessed 24 March 2009.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64 See generally E Gerstmann, The Constitutional Underclass: Gays, Lesbians, and the Failure of Class-Based
Equal Protection (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1999).
65 M Minow, ‘Should Religious Groups be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?’ (2007) 48 Boston College L Rev
781–849, 820.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid 821.
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but the scope of the exceptions varies’.68 Lower courts have upheld legislative
exceptions within both gender and sexuality anti-discrimination laws on the
basis of religion, and the US Supreme Court has ‘acknowledged the propriety
of legislative accommodations’ which seek to balance rights.69
Courts are guided by several key cases when considering the apparent clash
between religion and sexuality. In this jurisprudence, claims are made for a
judicially created exceptional space on the basis of freedom of religion and
conscience. The Supreme Court, however, rigorously adopted the belief-
manifestation dichotomy in determining the breadth of the right to free exercise
of religion (the ‘Free Exercise Clause’) in Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v Smith.70 The majority made clear that the Clause
would be given a narrow interpretation, such that no ‘individual’s religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting
conduct that the State is free to regulate’.71 Distinguishing earlier cases—most
famously Sherbert v Verner72 and Wisconsin v Yoder73—the Court was loathe to
require reasonable accommodation on the part of the state with respect to
otherwise valid law of general application, unless Free Exercise was raised in
conjunction with other rights, such as freedom of speech or the press (a ‘hybrid
situation’).74 Free Exercise claims ‘unconnected with any communicative
activity or parental right’ do not give rise to a valid claim of exceptionality, even
if the law incidentally burdens religion.75 Of course, if the law is, in fact,
designed to restrict religious practices, then a heightened test of justification by
a compelling interest which is narrowly tailored, will be applied.76
Smith has been subject to considerable criticism, both from within the
judiciary and by those who support religious rights, because of its narrow
approach to religious accommodation.77 This controversy is not surprising in
a nation state characterized both by the separation of church and state, as well
as by the strength of religion in the public sphere. Blackmun J described the
ruling in Smith as ‘a wholesale overturning of settled law concerning the
Religion Clauses of our Constitution’.78 Thus, claims for exceptional space in
68 Dent (n 13) 566.
69 Ibid 560.
70 494 US 872 (1989).
71 Ibid 878–9.
72 374 US 398 (1963).
73 406 US 205 (1972).
74
Smith (n 70) 882.
75 Ibid.
76
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc v City of Hialeah 508 US 520 (1992).
77 See eg Dent (n 13) 558.
78
Smith (n 70) 908. Congress responded with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (and a number of states
took similar decisions). This law sought to restore the broader definition of free exercise; and ‘more than half the
states appear to have adopted some version of the Sherbert-Yoder test’: D Laycock, ‘Theology Scholarships, the
Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes by Missing the Liberty’ (2004) 118 Harv L
Rev 155–246, 212.
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relation to religious freedom from the constraints of anti-discrimination law
face high hurdles:
The Supreme Court has never granted a religious organization a free exercise
exemption from any law and has on occasion denied such an exemption. Lower
courts have found a free exercise exemption for religious organizations from general
antidiscrimination laws with respect to employees who perform priestly functions, but
they have not exempted religiously affiliated social services organizations and schools
from labor laws.79
Moreover, ‘religious groups largely receive no exemptions from laws prohibiting
race discrimination [and] some exemptions from laws forbidding gender
discrimination’,80 although a claim by an employer that discrimination is
allowed because of a ‘bona fide occupational qualification’ could be raised in
narrow circumstances.81 Finally, an employee claiming that a requirement to
‘behave toward homosexuals or homosexuality in a way incompatible with her
religion’ violates her conscience, will likely find that accommodation amounts
to undue hardship for the employer, and therefore it will not be judicially
ordered.82 Additional complications arise in the context of private employers
receiving public funding—such as grants or vouchers—and ‘it remains an open
question whether federal law permits employers subsidized by the government
to avoid statutory and constitutional restrictions on the use of religion in
employment decisions’.83
In contrast, claims for exceptional spaces of discrimination in the face of
sexuality equality laws have found some judicial favour when grounded in the
First Amendment rights of free speech and association. This potentially could
be useful to faith-based objectors in the future. The case law also underscores
the power of free speech rights in US constitutional law, which can easily
override competing claims. In Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, Inc,84 at issue was the applicability of the Massachusetts
public accommodation law, which prohibited ‘any distinction, discrimination
or restriction on account of . . . sexual orientation . . . relative to the admission of
any person to, or treatment in any place of public accommodation, resort or
amusement’.85 GLIB was a lesbian and gay group of Irish American ancestry
who demanded the right to participate in the Boston St Patrick’s Day Parade.
They had been excluded by parade organizers because of the ‘message’ that
79 Dent (n 13) 559.
80 Minow (n 65) 782.
81
Corporation of the Presiding Bishops v Amos 483 US 327 (1987).
82 Dent (n 13) 564.
83 Minow (n 65) 814. This situation is analogous to the debate surrounding adoption by same-sex couples
and Catholic adoption agencies in the UK. I consider the question in CF Stychin, ‘Faith in Rights: the Struggle
Over Same-Sex Adoption in the United Kingdom’ (2008) 17 Constitutional Forum Constitutionnel 7–15.
84 515 US 557 (1994). For a thorough analysis of the decision see CA Yalda, ‘Walking the Straight and
Narrow: Performative Sexuality and the First Amendment After Hurley’ (1999) 8 Social and Legal Studies
25–45.
85 Hurley (n 84) 561.
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their inclusion would convey. State courts found in favour of GLIB, but the US
Supreme Court disagreed. Souter J, for a unanimous Court, reasoned that
petitioners had no intention of excluding:
homosexuals as such, and no individual member of GLIB claims to have been
excluded from parading as a member of any group that the Council has approved to
march. Instead, the disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its own parade
unit carrying its own banner. Since every participating unit affects the message
conveyed by the private organizers, the state courts’ application of the statute
produced an order essentially requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content of
their parade.86
The Court characterized GLIB’s claim as involving the public accommoda-
tion of the ‘sponsors’ speech itself ’,87 which would violate the First
Amendment right ‘that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of
his own message’.88 Public accommodation gives way because the right in issue
is collective, associational, and expressive. This becomes a clash of groups
seeking to control the message of one of them. Of course, the Court easily
could have described the parade in terms which would have led to the opposite
result. The parade could have been interpreted, not as an organized act of
speech in which each unit was chosen for its contribution to a harmonious
message, but instead as a cacophony of diverse voices in which any members of
the public could participate by right.89 In that scenario, accommodation might
well have been a compelling claim.
Sexuality equality rights, and the right of expressive association, again came
in conflict in Boy Scouts of America v Dale.90 The Supreme Court considered
whether the application of New Jersey’s public accommodation law violated the
First Amendment right of the Boy Scouts of America. Dale was a scout leader
and his membership was revoked solely because of his sexual orientation. Here
again, the Court characterized the right in collective, expressive and asso-
ciational terms, which demanded a constitutionally mandated exception from
anti-discrimination law:
The forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s freedom
of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way
the group’s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints. . . .But to come within its
ambit, a group must engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or
private.91
86 Ibid 572–3.
87 Ibid 573.
88 Ibid.
89 I explore this point in detail in CF Stychin, ‘Celebration and Consolidation: National Rituals and the Legal
Construction of American Identities’ (1998) 18 OJLS 265–91.
90 530 US 640 (1999).
91 Ibid 648.
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According to Rehnquist CJ, this limit to public accommodation was directly
applicable on the facts: ‘Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very
least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and
the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate
form of behaviour’.92 This would undermine the Scouts’ assertion that same-
sex sexual conduct runs counter to the ‘Scout Oath and Law’. Once a group is
found that ‘speaks’ a coherent message, then it cannot be forced to
accommodate an unwanted person who would distort it (even if that message
is contrary to the principle of equality).93 For religious rights advocates, this
reasoning is useful, since it characterizes rights, not in individualistic terms, but
collectively. It could provide the means of avoiding the narrowness of Smith.94
However, the Supreme Court has placed limits on the compelled speech
doctrine, and that perimeter was reached in a claim made on behalf of a group
of law schools and professors in Rumsfeld v Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights (FAIR).95 They claimed that the federal Solomon Amendment forced
them to speak a message that ran against their beliefs. The Amendment
provides that ‘if any part of an institution of higher education denies military
recruiters access equal to that provided other recruiters, the entire institution
will lose federal funds’.96 It had been enacted in response to the refusal of some
universities to allow the military to recruit on campuses because of its policy of
excluding homosexuals. Roberts CJ reasoned that ‘accommodating the
military’s message does not affect the law school’s speech, because the schools
are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting receptions’.97 Law
schools are not forced to accept members they do not desire, and the
Amendment seeks to affect conduct rather than speech.98 Thus, the reasoning in
Hurley and Dale was inapposite.
But the clash between religious freedom, speech and equality came together
most vividly in the California Supreme Court case of North Coast Women’s Care
Medical Group v Superior Court of San Diego County; Guadalupe T Benitez, Real
Party in Interest.99 A claim for exemption was made by a medical clinic’s
physicians from compliance with California’s prohibition against discrimination
based on sexual orientation. The facts turned on a lesbian woman’s request for
intrauterine insemination treatment. The Court applied the Smith test, holding
that the objectors had ‘no federal constitutional right to an exemption from
92 Ibid 653.
93 Ibid 654.
94 In dissent, Stevens J queried whether the Boy Scouts had a sufficiently clear message regarding sexual
orientation in the first place and found ‘no shared goal of disapproving of homosexuality’: ibid 684. In light of
this finding, the right to associate was not infringed since the application of the public accommodation law would
not impose a serious burden. Dale’s inclusion ‘sends no cognizable message to the Scouts or to the world’, unlike
the facts in Hurley: ibid 694.
95 547 US 47 (2006).
96 Ibid 51.
97 Ibid 64.
98 Ibid 60.
99 44 Cal 4th 1145 (2008).
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a neutral and valid law of general applicability on the ground that compliance
with that law is contrary to the objector’s religious beliefs’.100 With respect to
the California Constitution, Kennard J held that—for the sake of argument—
even under the standard of strict scrutiny, the claim would fail, as the
compelling state interest in ‘ensuring full and equal access to medical treatment
irrespective of sexual orientation’ could only be furthered through this
means.101 He also rejected the ‘hybrid claim’ of free speech plus free exercise
of religion.102 In so doing, the Court narrowed the potential for ever expanding
exceptional space: ‘[f]or purposes of the free speech clause, simple obedience to
a law that does not require one to convey a verbal or symbolic message cannot
reasonably be seen as a statement of support for the law or its purpose’.103
It thus refused to accept that a requirement to obey anti-discrimination law
to which one has a conscientious objection constitutively raised a speech claim,
as legal obedience in itself does not force one to articulate a message. The logic
behind this argument is compelling, but no doubt disappointing to potential
conscientious objectors.104
What the case law suggests, above all else, is the deep divergence in world
views around sexuality that characterizes the American polity. For example,
it remains academically acceptable to articulate an anti-equality viewpoint in an
American law review in inflammatory and derogatory terms:
Disapproval of homosexuality is not irrational bigotry. Most adults are instinctively
sexually attracted to members of the other sex and not to members of their own sex.
Because of reproduction, there are compelling evolutionary reasons for this attitude.
Some heterosexual acts are also non-reproductive, but few heterosexuals completely
eschew heterosexual intercourse, as homosexuals do. Most people are repelled by
homosexuality. Given its propensity to transmit disease, this revulsion, too, makes
biological sense. This makes it unlikely that distaste for homosexuality will soon
vanish. Laws promoting acceptance of homosexuality are also less needed than laws
promoting racial harmony. Discrimination against gays is not uncommon, but it is
hardly pervasive, it varies by location and industry and is rare in many places and
fields where gays live and work. . . . [E]ven if sexual preference cannot be altered, public
behaviour can be; people can be encouraged to keep their sex lives private.105
While the unexplored assumptions which underpin this (admittedly extreme)
passage are too numerous to explore and rebut here, it does provide a useful
100 Ibid 1155.
101 Ibid 1158.
102 Ibid 1156.
103 Ibid 1157.
104 In a concurring judgment, Baxter J pondered in obiter dictum whether the result might be different in the
case of a sole medical practitioner. In that scenario, the balancing of interests might lead to a different outcome:
ibid 1159. It is clear that the judiciary’s approach to exceptionality depends upon the anti-discrimination ground.
For example, religious organizations cannot legally discriminate on the basis of race, which reflects the
fundamental character of the governmental interest in eradicating racial discrimination, and the unacceptability of
exceptions: Bob Jones University v United States 461 US 574 (1982).
105 Dent (n 13) 631–2 [emphasis added].
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summary of a world view which continues to be held by many in the United
States, most usually for reasons grounded in religious faith. It promotes the
public–private dichotomy as a regulatory device for lesbians and gay men, while
rejecting it for the religious. For those who subscribe to this set of beliefs,
developments in anti-discrimination law will be resisted, and a range of legal
claims no doubt will continue to appear.
A more reasoned justification for religious exceptions from the principle of
equality has been succinctly described by Martha Minow:
Exemptions of some sort can be justified out of respect for the liberty of conscience at
the core of the free exercise clause, acknowledgment of the contributions religious
organizations have brought to individuals and society over time, and prudential
avoidance of direct confrontation between the government and influential religious
groups over controversial issues.106
The central question though remains: ‘how can a pluralistic society commit to
both equality and tolerance of religious differences?’.107 The American experi-
ence suggests that there is no simple answer, and a balancing of rights implicitly
underpins the application of constitutional doctrine. Although the focus on
expression and association may appear to have the benefit of certainty, the
arbitrariness of the speech-conduct distinction undermines that apparent
advantage.
4. Accommodating Pluralism
Although Canadian political culture diverges significantly from that of the
United States, particularly around the combination of sexuality and religion,
claims for accommodation have also played an important role. The Canadian
jurisprudence demonstrates a more ‘expansive and robust’ approach to reli-
gious freedom, in that religious pluralism is explicitly a good to be promoted
by the state,108 and ‘symbolizes Canadian constitutionalism’s commitment to
multiculturalism and the protection of plural cultural forms’.109 Freedom of
conscience and belief was explicitly included in the enumerated Charter rights
(s 2(a)), and religion has played a significant role in rights discourse throughout
Canadian history, long before the Charter’s enactment.110 Unlike the USA,
‘[t]he Canadian courts have held that section 2(a) of the Charter can be
violated by the indirect effects of facially neutral laws’.111
106 Minow (n 65) 782.
107 Ibid 783.
108 B Ryder, ‘State Neutrality and Freedom of Conscience and Religion’ (2005) 29S Ct L Rev (2d) 169–99,
173. See also, M Sinclair, ‘Freedom of Religion in Canada and France: Implications for Citizenship and
Judgment’ (2006) 15 Dalhousie JLS 39–68.
109 Berger (n 8) 279.
110 Fielding (n 9) 33–4.
111 Ryder (n 108) 173.
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But rights claims around sexuality have fared particularly well in the Charter
years, despite the fact that sexual orientation was not included as an explicit
basis for protection under the equality rights guarantees.112 Having been ‘read
into’ s 15 of the Charter by the Supreme Court of Canada, sexuality equality
has come to be one of the success stories of Charter politics, most famously
demonstrated by the acceptance of the right to same-sex marriage by the
Canadian government.113 However, it would be a misunderstanding to
construct Canadian constitutional politics as a linear tale of progress for
lesbian and gay rights campaigners, in which the ‘irrationality’ of faith-based
opponents has been swept aside. Freedom of religion continues to play a
significant role in Charter jurisprudence: ‘respect for and tolerance of the rights
and practices of religious minorities is one of the hallmarks of an enlightened
democracy’.114 Recent years have demonstrated the contentiousness of
balancing religious rights against sexuality equality claims.
Two Supreme Court of Canada cases have explicitly addressed the apparent
clash of rights within the context of administrative law. In Trinity Western
University v College of Teachers,115 the Court considered a decision by the British
Columbia College of Teachers (BCCT) to refuse an application by Trinity
Western University (TWU) to assume complete responsibility for a teacher
training program, as a consequence of which, students would no longer
be required to undertake a final year at Simon Fraser University prior to
accreditation. TWU’s aim was to ensure ‘the full program reflect the Christian
world view of TWU’.116 The rejection of the application by BCCT was based
upon the ‘Community Standards’ document that TWU students were required
to sign as a condition for admission, which—amongst many other prohibi-
tions—obliged members of the TWU community to refrain from same-sex
sexual acts.117 BCCT argued that their power to regulate in the public interest
required them to consider discriminatory practices on the part of applicants,
a point on which the Supreme Court agreed.118 However, the majority dis-
agreed with BCCT’s conclusion that the admissions policy was exclusionary,
and that future teachers would be insufficiently prepared ‘for the diversity
of public school students’.119 Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ, for the majority,
reasoned that the admissions policy alone did not evidence s 15 Charter
discrimination, and to conclude otherwise would unbalance the competing
rights at issue: ‘to state that the voluntary adoption of a code of conduct based
112 See KA Lahey, Are We Persons Yet: Law and Sexuality in Canada (University of Toronto Press, Toronto
1999).
113 Smith (n 5). The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the validity of same-sex marriage: Reference re Same-
Sex Marriage [2004] 3 SCR 698 [finding no effect from the civil marriage legislation on religious marriage].
114 Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem [2004] 2 SCR 551 [1].
115 [2001] 1 SCR 772.
116 Ibid [2].
117 Ibid [3].
118 Ibid [14].
119 Ibid [11].
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on a person’s own religious beliefs, in a private institution, is sufficient to
engage s 15 would be inconsistent with freedom of conscience and religion
which co-exist with the right to equality’.120 The rights were not in conflict
because no concrete evidence had been presented that TWU graduates would
be impaired in their role as school teachers.121 According to the majority, this
was a case about belief rather than conduct, and ‘the freedom of individuals to
adhere to certain religious beliefs while at TWU should be respected’.122
But the manipulability of the belief–conduct dichotomy was underlined in
the dissenting judgment of L’Heureux-Dube_ J. After finding that a high level of
deference should be given to BCCT, she reasoned that its decision fell well
within the bounds of reasonableness.123 Although TWU as a religious institu-
tion may have been exempt from the British Columbia Human Rights Code in
this respect, nevertheless this was not simply a matter of private belief, but a
manifestation that warranted the concern of BCCT:
Signing the Community Standards contract . . .makes the student or employee com-
plicit in an overt, but not illegal, act of discrimination against homosexuals and
bisexuals. With respect, I do not see why my colleagues classify this signature as
part of the freedom of belief as opposed to the narrower freedom to act on those
beliefs. . . . [I]t is not patently unreasonable for the BCCT to treat their public
expressions of discrimination as potentially affecting the public school communities in
which TWU graduates wish to teach.124
L’Heureux-Dube_ J highlighted the importance of supportive classroom
environments for lesbian and gay students, drawing on a wealth of social
science evidence.125 In the context of a history of discrimination, BCCT’s
decision was ‘a reasonable proactive measure’.126 While she accepted that her
decision would impact upon the freedom of expression of TWU students—by
requiring them to undertake a year of their training at another, secular
institution—the violation was saved under s 1 of the Charter: ‘once graduates
ask to be accredited for public school teaching, the public interest comes to the
fore and reasonable secular requirements can be imposed without infringing the
freedom of religion’.127
A contrasting judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada is Chamberlain v
Surrey School District No 36.128 This case turned on the Surrey School Board’s
decision to refuse to authorize three books for primary school classrooms
because they presented same-sex parented families (amongst a range of
120 Ibid [25].
121 Ibid [32].
122 Ibid [36].
123 Ibid [83].
124 Ibid [72].
125 Ibid [82].
126 Ibid [86].
127 Ibid [106].
128 [2002] 4 SCR 710.
WINTER 2009 Sexuality, Religion and the Public Sphere 745
family forms). Writing for a majority, McLachlin CJ held that the School Board
failed to conform to the secular requirements of the School Act, which
rendered the decision unreasonable.129 The Chief Justice explored what a
requirement of secularism entailed in this context, and she explicitly engaged in
a balancing of rights:
Religion is an integral aspect of people’s lives, and cannot be left at the boardroom
door. What secularism does rule out, however, is any attempt to use the religious
views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other
members of the community. A requirement of secularism implies that, although the
Board is indeed free to address the religious concerns of parents, it must be sure to do
so in a manner that gives equal recognition and respect to other members of the
community.130
Instead of following this approach, the Board had permitted itself to act as ‘the
proxy of a particular religious view’,131 which failed to respect the value of
diversity, and ‘gave no consideration to the needs of children of same-sex
parented families’.132 Moreover, the Board failed to consider the objective of
making all children fully aware of the diversity of family forms in society.133
In contrast, in a wide ranging dissent, Gonthier J (writing for himself and
Bastarache J), balanced the rights in a radically different fashion. For him, this
was an issue of responsiveness to parental concern about the ‘age appropriate-
ness’ of classroom material,134and the Board was ‘acting as an elected, repre-
sentative body’.135 As well, conduct (as opposed to identity) was of relevance,
not only to faith, but also to same-sex sexuality:
[P]ersons who believe that homosexual behaviour, manifest in the conduct of persons
involved in same-sex relationships, is immoral or not morally equivalent to hetero-
sexual behaviour, for religious or non-religious reasons, are entitled to hold and
express that view. On the other hand, persons who believe that homosexual behav-
iour is morally equivalent to heterosexual behaviour are also entitled to hold and
express that view. Both groups, however, are not entitled to act in a discriminatory
manner. . . .Adults in Canadian society who think that homosexual behaviour is immoral
can still be staunchly committed to non-discrimination.136
It is this characterization of a separation of identity from act—the sinner from
the sin—which distinguishes Gonthier J in Chamberlain from L’Heureux-Dube_
J in Trinity Western University. His reasoning mirrors that of some conservative
Christians, who claim to be increasingly marginalized in the private sphere by
129 Ibid [3].
130 Ibid [19].
131 Ibid [27].
132 Ibid [60].
133 Ibid [61].
134 Ibid [117].
135 Ibid [118].
136 Ibid [126-127] [emphasis added].
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the ‘political correctness’ of liberal elites.137 However, Gonthier J’s rhetoric
may prove too much, as it is unclear how the presentation of same-sex parented
families as existing in Canadian society is inextricably linked to sexual acts,
unless the simple fact of existence gives rise to an assumption of sexual activity.
If so, then all representations of lesbians and gay men become necessarily
sexual. But then it is logically the case that belief in the immorality of same-sex
sexual acts is a form of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, as
L’Heureux-Dube_ J contends in Trinity Western University, since the dichotomy
collapses.
Nevertheless, for Gonthier J, the accommodation that was struck by the
Surrey School Board adequately and appropriately balanced the rights. The
case also provided Gonthier J with the opportunity to embark upon a
consideration of the meaning of diversity, pluralism and tolerance, and his
conclusions contrast sharply to those of the Chief Justice. For Gonthier J,
the reasonable accommodation of views ‘must reflect a two-way street in the
context of conflicting beliefs’.138 It demands that religion, like sexuality, be
allowed space within the public sphere, and Gonthier J does recognize how the
public-private distinction has a regulatory function, no matter which group is
potentially relegated to the closet:
It is often suggested . . . that religious belief and practice, and public policy decisions
based on such views, ought to effectively be privatized, retreated into the religious
‘closets’ of home or church . . . perhaps so too should the development of beliefs as to
what is or is not appropriate sexual conduct be undertaken in the private sphere, since
it is clear that the nature of both kinds of belief, although constitutionally protected,
are publicly contested. In my view, however, it is preferable that no constitutionally
protected right be forced exclusively into the private sphere. . . .An acceptable resolu-
tion is accommodation or balancing.139
Of course, the decision of the Surrey School Board did relegate same-sex
parented families to the private sphere, in that it made them invisible in the
classroom. Consequently, it is difficult to comprehend how Gonthier J’s reasons
lead to access to all, instead of a hijacking of the public sphere, as McLachlin
CJ contends. Nevertheless, I want to hang on to the usefulness of the idea(l) of
a public sphere in which competing views can be represented, for consideration
in the next section of this article.
5. Towards an Inclusive Public Sphere
The contrasting judgments in Chamberlain highlight divergent ways in which
the clash between sexuality and faith can be understood. The Chief Justice’s
137 See Stychin (n 83).
138
Chamberlain (n 128) [134].
139 Ibid [135].
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resort to the values of liberalism, tolerance, and the inherent good of being
exposed to a range of lifestyles, will appeal to many liberals. Indeed, it is the
language that lesbian and gay rights campaigners have themselves frequently
deployed. Furthermore, the banning of books in the classroom strikes at the
heart of liberalism. Nevertheless, Gonthier J’s dissent points us towards key
issues that reappear throughout this article. In order to make sense of faith,
liberalism has interpreted it through its own frame of reference, and it does this
through the fundamental distinctions between belief and conduct; private and
public: ‘law’s rendering of religion strongly aligns it with the private and, given
legal liberalism’s commitment to the public/private divide, this association
creates identifiable tensions for law’s treatment of public expressions of
religious commitment’.140
For lesbians and gays, these distinctions are not novel—they are precisely the
same ones that have been (and, I would argue, continue to be) deployed to
regulate sexual identities. Queer theory and politics have powerfully demon-
strated the bankruptcy of these analytical categories141 and, for those of faith,
they are no less impoverished. So too, critical scholars of law have long
understood that liberal neutrality can never be truly liberal, nor genuinely
neutral.142 Queer legal theorists have reiterated that liberal law is illusory.143
Therefore, ‘we’ should not be surprised when faith-based communities now
make the same argument about liberalism, namely that, rather than being
neutral, it is a world view that ultimately imposes itself.144 Reason and rights
are the lenses through which all competing views are judged, which must only
speak in the public sphere when they abide by the terms of liberalism.145
My question is whether a richer form of liberalism could provide better
answers.146 In particular, could we aspire to a vision that recognizes that deeply
held world views may not be reconcilable but nevertheless could be accom-
modated? To the extent that we reject the closeting of the private sphere, can
there be some basis on which meaningful accommodation in the public sphere
can proceed? I have argued in this article that, for those of faith, one of
the fears is marginalization and ghettoization. For lesbians and gays, the fear
is that hard fought rights victories could be eviscerated by the creation of an
ever expanding exceptional space of discrimination. The newly emergent
140 Berger (n 8) 305–6.
141 See eg JE Halley, ‘The Construction of Heterosexuality’ in M Warner (ed), Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer
Politics and Social Theory (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1993) 82.
142 See eg C Gearty, ‘Sex and the Secular Liberal’ The Tablet (London 10 February 2007) 8.
143 See eg W Morgan, ‘Queering International Human Rights Law’ in C Stychin and D Herman (eds),
Sexuality in the Legal Arena (Athlone, London 2000) 208.
144 Rivers (n 11) 51–2.
145 Ibid.
146 On the different forms of liberalism, see Fielding (n 9) 31.
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‘sexual citizen’ thus could find her rights are very hollow.147 How can this zero
sum game be resolved?
While those of faith—and their proponents such as Gonthier J—resort to the
language of balancing and accommodation, there is rarely any consideration
of how this balancing would actually be undertaken in hard cases.148 Some
advocates of gay rights find the balance to be remarkably easy; the closeting of
discriminatory views in the private sphere, particularly when they are held by
servants of the state: ‘[r]eligious individuals are perfectly free and welcome to
participate in public decision making, on the condition that they leave their
religious arguments at home’.149 This approach is consistent with the narrowed
scope of the Free Exercise Clause under Smith. But such an interpretation
corrodes any idea of genuine pluralism, and ignores the fact that liberal rights
were intended to be founded on a vision which recognizes ‘that religious belief
has special value and deserves special protection’.150 In contrast, the claim of
religious rights advocates that they should be entitled to a general exception—as
the only alternative to the ghetto—in order to manifest their deeply held
beliefs,151 could create a patchwork of rights protection, and undermine the
equality rights of sexual citizens. After all, exceptions can become the rule.
I want to argue, in the alternative, that balancing and accommodation
demands some form of contextual analysis, which engages with the competing
interests on the particular facts. Compromises will be inevitable in this exercise,
and the analysis is perhaps best characterized in terms of the values of
mediation rather than litigation.152 Central will be the goal of civility and
the hope that areas of common ground might be found. It also requires
a recognition that rights discourse can rely on ‘solidarity and shared values’, as
opposed to the pursuit of victory at all (social) cost.153 For example, in Ladele,
lesbian and gay rights campaigners may need to accept that Ms Ladele’s views
are deeply and genuinely held and deserve tolerance, and that Islington Council
should try to accommodate her. It should be reluctant to demand that she act
against her conscience even though she is employed by the state, because
her departure from the public sphere would be a loss. Of course, this result
will depend upon whether accommodation of Ms Ladele in fact is possible,
147 On sexual citizenship, see eg D Bell and J Binnie, The Sexual Citizen: Queer Politics and Beyond (Polity,
Cambridge 2000).
148 It will certainly ‘require very careful interrogation of the competing claims’: N Bamforth, ‘Same-sex
Partnerships: Some Comparative Constitutional Lessons’ [2007] EHRLR 47–65, 65. Fielding insightfully
describes what is required as ‘a contextual, fact-specific analysis’: (n 9) 50. I am indebted to his framing of the
question in this way.
149 Wintemute (n 34) 140.
150 J Webber, ‘Understanding the Religion in Freedom of Religion’ in P Cane, C Evans and Z Robinson
(eds), Law and Religion in Theoretical and Historical Context (CUP, Cambridge 2008) 26, 26.
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or whether it would undermine the rights of lesbians and gays in Islington.
Only a factual analysis can answer that question.
In contrast, contextual balancing of interests might lead to different results in
the case of a small business proprietor who objects to being required to serve
lesbian and gay clients when the transaction is not in any obvious way
‘sexualized’. A useful example can be found in the Canadian case of Ontario
Human Rights Commission v Brockie.154 Mr Brockie owned a small printing
business. He also held:
a sincere religious belief . . . that homosexual conduct is sinful and, in the furtherance
of that belief, he must not assist in the dissemination of information intended to
spread the acceptance of a gay or lesbian (‘homosexual’) lifestyle. Mr Brockie draws
a distinction between acting for customers who are homosexual and acting in
furtherance of a homosexual lifestyle.155
Thus, the being and doing of homosexuality are immediately implicated.
The complainant was a director of the Canadian Lesbian and Gay Archives,
who sought Mr Brockie’s commercial printing services for some letterhead,
envelopes and business cards. Mr Brockie refused to contract with the Archives
because of his conscientious objection to furthering the homosexual lifestyle.156
The Board of Inquiry held that it was reasonable to limit freedom of religion
and conscience, which ‘does not extend to the practice of religious beliefs in the
public marketplace in Ontario’, in which sexual orientation is a prohibited
ground of discrimination.157 Legislation embodies the ‘community standards’
which all are required to respect.158 On appeal, Mr Brockie argued that his
dignity would be demeaned were he ‘conscripted to support a cause with which
he disagrees because of an honestly held and sincere religious belief ’.159
The High Court upheld the Board ruling but its reasoning is particularly
useful for its contextual analysis. The Court appreciated the need for
a balancing of the conflicting Charter values of freedom of religion against
‘the historical and continuing prejudice against homosexuals resulting in social
prejudice and economic disadvantage’.160 But the Court went further and
considered exactly how that balancing would be performed. It reasoned that, on
these facts, commercial services offered to the public are at the periphery of
freedom of religion.161 The ability to obtain services on a non-discriminatory
basis in the public sphere, however, is significant and far more central to the
154 Ontario Human Rights Commission v Brockie (2002) 222 DLR (4th) 174 (HC).
155 Ibid [3].
156 Ibid [15].
157 Ibid [16].
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160 Ibid [46].
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competing interest.162 The limitation on the right to freedom of religion—and
the Court recognized that a right was infringed—was justifiable.
The Court held, in obiter dictum, that there would be cases in which the
balancing process would lead to the opposite outcome, and it imaginatively
considered the hypothetical situation in which a request for printing services
could impair the core of freedom of religion:
If any particular printing project . . . contained material that conveyed a message
proselytizing and promoting the gay and lesbian lifestyle or ridiculed his religious
beliefs, such material might reasonably be held to be in direct conflict with the core
elements of Mr Brockie’s religious beliefs. On the other hand, if the particular
printing object contained a directory of goods and services that might be of interest to
the gay and lesbian community, that material might reasonably be held not to be in
direct conflict with the core elements of Mr Brockie’s religious beliefs.163
The fact situation in Brockie provides a useful illustration of the potential for
balancing, because of the way in which commercial printing can impart an
expressive message and thereby indirectly implicate expressive rights (which is
of such central concern in the American jurisprudence). What it suggests is that
there are no answers in the abstract, and courts will need to engage sensitively
with the interests at stake. But balancing also ensures that compromises will be
inevitable, and rights advocates on all sides may be disappointed by outcomes.
For example, advocates of freedom of religion are critical of Brockie,
reasoning that Mr Brockie’s conscientious objection was comprehensive, such
that any ‘cooperation’ with the ‘entire project’ of the Archives was deeply
offensive to him.164 Thus, his freedom was constrained, potentially limiting his
ability to enter the public sphere. In contrast, many lesbian and gay rights
advocates would be highly critical of a sympathetic hearing of Ms Ladele’s
claim. Given her role as government employee—and given the legal duty that
local government finds itself under to ensure the availability of civil partner-
ships—to require reasonable accommodation of her religious beliefs will seem
to them to be of dubious merit.
In fact, an analogous issue has been considered at length by academic
commentators in Canada, concerning whether ‘marriage commissioners’ should
be able to exercise a conscientious exemption to the performing of same-sex
marriages.165 Some advocates of lesbian and gay rights are highly sceptical of
this claim, expressing concern that it could lead to lesbian and gay rights being
undermined to such an extent that they become ‘citizen pariahs’.166 However,
advocates of religious freedom argue that the reasonable accommodation of
162 Ibid [55].
163 Ibid [56] [emphasis added].
164 IT Benson, ‘The Freedom of Conscience and Religion in Canada: Challenges and Opportunities’ (2007)
21 Emory Intl L Rev 111–65, 149.
165 See McDougall (n 34); Trotter (n 32).
166 McDougall (n 34) 357.
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employees would be entirely eviscerated if commissioners are forced to perform
same-sex marriages, leading to their exclusion in practice from the public
sphere in a religious ghetto, unable to participate in civic life.167 If reasonable
accommodation is to mean anything, it requires consideration of whether it
is practicable.168 The fact that an individual is employed by the state does
not mean that she has foregone the right to act on beliefs and to have a
conscience.169 While same-sex couples may have gained the right to marry in
Canada, they have not gained the right to insist on being married by a
particular marriage commissioner, nor have they gained the right to insist that
all marriage commissioners forego the exercise of their religious objections to
same-sex marriage in practice.170
My analysis would suggest here again that a nuanced analysis is in order, and
this would focus upon the sincerity of subjective belief; a consideration of
whether the right in issue is core to the system of beliefs (secular or religious);
the degree of difficulty involved in accommodation by the employer; whether
accommodation would significantly impair the exercise of the competing right;
and the material consequences of any impairment. This might require a
decision maker to reflect on, for example, whether a minimal delay in getting
a scheduled date for a marriage ceremony is a significant burden on a same-sex
couple. In contrast, a delay in being able to obtain a medical procedure because
of the conscientious objection of doctors and nurses is a far more serious
concern that might weigh heavily against the right of conscientious objectors,
as it did in North Coast Women’s Care.
Furthermore, a court might consider whether the legislature already has
engaged in a balancing exercise in the accommodation of rights, which might
lead to judicial deference. In the case of the Goods and Services Regulations,
exemptions have been created.171 As well, the Civil Partnership Act can be
understood as the outcome of a balancing of rights, in that the institution of
marriage remains the sole preserve of opposite-sex couples and civil partnership
lacks any legal requirement of consummation.172 In that context, a court might
find conscientious objection to same-sex marriage to be too remote from this
new, secular (and potentially non-sexual) legal status so as to warrant legal
recognition.
While some argue that the analysis in Brockie is unprincipled, I would argue
that it is both intuitively appealing and justifiable.173 Engaging with context,
and accommodating what otherwise would appear to be irreconcilable
167 Trotter (n 32) 367.
168 Ryder (n 108) 191.
169 Trotter (n 32) 385.
170 Benson (n 164) 158.
171 See generally, Sandberg and Doe (n 3).
172 See generally, N Barker, ‘Sex and the Civil Partnership Act: The Future of (Non) Conjugality?’ (2006) 14
Feminist L S 241–59.
173 The decision was cited with approval in Re Christian Institute (n 45) [115]–[117]. As Martha Minow
argues, ‘the effort to balance competing principles itself should not be viewed as a departure from
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world views, will not necessarily satisfy anyone, and it may appear to be the
triumph of pragmatism over principle. It also may be ill suited to an adversarial
rights forum.174 But it seems well suited to the social reality of pluralism
around religion and sexuality today.175 There are good reasons to eschew the
privatization of religion, both because it is recognized as of value in a pluralistic
society,176 and also pragmatically to avoid ghettoization.177 Real pluralism is
about the reality of the irreconcilable existing side by side, civilly, in the public
sphere, and of finding ways of living together.178 But what this also demands is
recognition that religion represents, not simply the exercise of a choice, but an
identity and even an alternative to reason, which may not be comprehensible in
liberal terms.179 In that context, we are left with tolerance as a basis for moving
forward.180
In this regard, Jennifer Nedelsky argues, drawing on Hannah Arendt’s idea
of the ‘enlarged mentality’, that we can approach public policy issues through
‘our imaginative capacity to put ourselves in the position of another’.181 I find
her analysis useful as a means by which rights advocates can be persuaded
of the need for compromise. Nedelsky argues that religion can provide an
‘important countervailing norm’ to the rational, self-interested subject of
rights,182 and she notes that Arendt posited that ‘reflective judgment’ demands
‘taking others’ perspectives into account in order not to be limited by one’s
own interests and idiosyncracies’.183 Of particular value is Nedelsky’s obser-
vation that those who claim conscientious objection do so from a perspective
that embodies ‘a sense of loss and anger’ at the marginalization of their world
view in the face of ‘deep social transformation’.184 She argues that the enlarged
mentality requires ‘taking loss seriously’,185 although she recognizes that, in the
conflict over same-sex marriage, ‘it is not clear to me what exactly one should
principle’: M Minow, ‘Is Pluralism an Ideal or a Compromise?: An Essay for Carol Weisbrod’ (2008) 40
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Cane, Evans and Robinson, (n 150) 243, 248. But see also, Bradney (n 6) 40, wherein accommodation is
distinguished from tolerance.
181 J Nedelsky, ‘Legislative Judgment and the Enlarged Mentality: Taking Religious-Perspectives’ in R W
Bauman and T Kahana (eds), The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State (CUP,
Cambridge 2006) 93, 98. See generally, H Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (University of Chicago
Press, Chicago 1982).
182 Ibid 101.
183 Ibid 105.
184 Ibid 106–107.
185 Ibid 108.
WINTER 2009 Sexuality, Religion and the Public Sphere 753
do with such understanding’.186 What I think it requires is some level of mutual
respect, tolerance for viewpoints that are incomprehensible to oneself, and a
recognition that the public-private dichotomy of the closet is damaging to all
humanity.
But Nedelsky also favours seeking out common ground from what may, on
the surface, seem to be incommensurable world views, and she shares this aim
with Martha Minow.187 This seems a tall order when dealing, for example, with
conservative Christianity and lesbian and gay activism. As Judith Butler notes,
on first glance, ‘it would appear that there are no points of cultural contact
between sexual progressives and religious minorities that are not encounters of
violence and exclusion’.188 Nevertheless, both Nedelsky and Minow argue that
it is the normatively preferred position. On reflection, it strikes me that the task
may not always be as difficult as it initially seems. For example, opponents of
same-sex marriage often deploy similar arguments to those articulated by queer
and feminist theorists in terms of the deprivileging of the sexualized couple
in favour of the legal recognition and social valuing of a range of different
relationships of care.189 While I fully appreciate the radical differences between
the two positions, they also display a remarkable similarity. Martha Minow
points out that this can play itself out in policy formation, but only by
bracketing the marriage issue completely and emphasizing common ground.190
The analysis can be taken further, focusing on critical perspectives on
neoliberalism and the importance of the social dimension of care in a capitalist
society.191 Here too, there might be important points of commonality between
at least some of faith and some queer activists. Finally, as I have argued in this
article, both positions share a rejection of the public–private dichotomy, which
serves to marginalize, silence and closet, hollowing out rights by separating
belief from manifestation.
But there must also be conditions attached to entry into the public sphere,
which ultimately are grounded in the principles of liberalism. In particular,
ethical rules of engagement will need to be accepted as a condition of entry:
openness to the Other, reciprocity, mutual respect, the ability to listen, good faith,
the ability to reach compromises, and a willingness to rely on discussion to resolve
stalemates. The institution of a culture of compromise largely centres on all of these
factors that foster the coordination of action and the peaceful, concerted resolution
of disputes.192
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I would argue that rights politics in the UK is well disposed to such a model of
rights based on ‘democratic dialogue and compromise’, in which pragmatic
solutions will be preferred to ideological stalemates.193 This is pluralism at the
coalface, in which purity is foregone, solutions may not be pleasing to
participants, and agreements are contingent and partial. Nevertheless, I believe
that this is a model of society that allows people to live together, if not in
harmony, then at least in civility.
6. Concluding Thoughts
The conflict between religion, sexuality and rights is of increasing importance
in the United Kingdom today. In this article, I have explored how liberal
democracies grapple with this seemingly intractable issue, using examples
drawn from North America to enrich our emerging UK jurisprudence. I have
attempted to find a way forward which not only recognizes liberalism’s
limitations in terms of the public–private dichotomy, but also its strengths in
terms of the need for respect and civility in the public sphere. My ‘faith’ is that
rights politics in the UK may lend itself to a model of accommodation and
compromise which avoids intransigence and instead seeks out common ground.
Although the task may be challenging, the consequences of failure, to my mind,
justify the effort.
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